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THE GORSUCH TEST: GUNDY V. UNITED
STATES, LIMITING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE, AND THE FUTURE OF
NONDELEGATION
JOHNATHAN HALL†
ABSTRACT
The future of nondelegation is uncertain. Long considered an
“axiom in constitutional law,” the nondelegation principle has almost
never been seriously enforced—from the founding of the country to
present day. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Gundy v. United
States, that truism may soon change.
For much of its recent history, the Court has approached
nondelegation challenges using the “intelligible principle” test. Now,
for the first time in many years, five Justices have indicated a
willingness to revisit that test. In his dissenting opinion in Gundy,
Justice Gorsuch proposed a new test—the “Gorsuch test”—for
adjudicating nondelegation disputes. He averred that a legislature can
only give power under three circumstances: (1) to “fill up the details”;
(2) to make the application of a rule dependent on certain executive
fact-finding; or (3) to assign nonlegislative responsibilities to either the
judicial or executive branch.
This Note is among the first scholarly pieces to examine the Gorsuch
test and its potential implications for administrative law. By tracing
previous nondelegation tests and proposals, this Note argues that
Justice Gorsuch’s proposal would severely curtail Congress’s ability to
transfer authority efficiently, limit the administrative state, imperil
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potentially hundreds of thousands of statutes, cause doctrinal
confusion, and force a change that will be difficult to apply. Ultimately,
the Court should not adopt this proposal and instead continue to apply
the decades-old intelligible principle test.

INTRODUCTION
Article I, § 1 of the Constitution vests legislative power in
Congress.1 The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to bar
congressional delegations of power to any other branch of
government.2 The nondelegation doctrine is “an axiom in
constitutional law . . . universally recognized as a principle essential to
the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained
by the Constitution.”3 However, although nondelegation has been
“universally recognized,” it has gone almost universally unenforced.4
For much of its recent history, the Court has analyzed
nondelegation claims using the “intelligible principle” test established
in J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States.5 So long as Congress laid
down “an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized
. . . is directed to conform,” the delegation passed constitutional
muster.6 Apart from two instances in 1935, no act of Congress has ever
been struck down as violating this principle.7
On June 20, 2019, the Supreme Court handed down a fractured
opinion in its nondelegation jurisprudence: Gundy v. United States.8
After hearing arguments in Gundy with only eight members (Justice
Brett Kavanaugh had yet to be confirmed), the Court ruled on the
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”).
2. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 697 (1892) (Lamar, J., concurring) (“[N]o part of this
legislative power can be delegated by Congress to any other department of the government,
executive or judicial. . . .”).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2364 (2001)
(“It is, after all, a commonplace that the nondelegation doctrine is no doctrine at all.”).
5. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
6. Id. at 409.
7. See Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (“[I]n every case in which the
question has been raised, the Court has recognized that there are limits of delegation which there
is no constitutional authority to transcend. We think that [this case] goes beyond those limits.”);
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935) (“We think that the . . .
authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.”); see also Cass R.
Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) (remarking that the
nondelegation doctrine “has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting)”).
8. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
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merits nine months later.9 Justice Elena Kagan wrote the plurality
opinion and applied the traditional intelligible principle test to find the
disputed statute constitutionally sound.10 But, strikingly, for the first
time since 1935, four Justices expressed a willingness to revisit a
doctrine that had been undisturbed for over eighty years. Justice Neil
Gorsuch, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas and Chief Justice John
Roberts, dissented and proposed a new test for approaching
nondelegation challenges.11 Justice Gorsuch averred that the
legislature could only give power under three circumstances: (1) to “fill
up the details”; (2) to make the application of a rule dependent on
certain executive fact-finding; or (3) to assign nonlegislative
responsibilities to either the judicial or executive branch.12 The three
prongs of his analysis formed the new “Gorsuch test.”13
Justice Samuel Alito provided the fifth vote to uphold the statute
but wrote separately, noting that the Court has permitted
“extraordinarily capacious standards” in the past.14 At the same time,
he stated an openness to reconsidering the intelligible principle test if
a majority of the Court would vote in its favor.15 Otherwise, it would
be odd to single out this statute for lacking a discernable standard.16
Thus, the future of the doctrine seems to rest with Justice
Kavanaugh, who tipped his hand in the early October 2019 term. In
response to the same nondelegation statutory challenge raised in
Gundy, Justice Kavanaugh agreed that “Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly
analysis of the Constitution’s nondelegation in his Gundy dissent may
warrant further consideration in future cases.”17 The Court, he
9. Id. at 2116. On October 6, 2018, four days after Gundy was argued, Justice Brett
Kavanagh joined the Court, cementing a five-Justice conservative majority. John Bresnahan &
Burgess Evertett, Kavanaugh Wins Confirmation to the Supreme Court, POLITICO (Oct. 6, 2018,
3:14 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/10/06/kavanaugh-confirmation-vote-877357
[https://perma.cc/6RTY-LVSC].
10. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2118, 2129.
11. Id. at 2131, 2136–37 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 2136–37.
13. Given the lack of scholarly work on this topic, this Note creates the phrase “the Gorsuch
test.”
14. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
15. See id. at 2131 (“If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we
have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.”).
16. Id.
17. Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (mem.). In the October 2018 term,
Justice Kavanaugh joined the conservative Justices in many high-profile cases, including joining
Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in another major administrative law case, Kisor v. Wilkie,
139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). In Kisor, Justice Kavanaugh agreed with
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declared, must ensure that “major national policy decisions [are] made
by Congress,” not the executive branch.18
Although observers should always be wary of prognostication on
how a Justice might vote, it seems possible—if not likely—that there
will be five votes to strike down broad delegations of power and apply
some version of the Gorsuch test. If the Court chooses to adopt a
stricter nondelegation test, it could imperil an estimated three hundred
thousand rules that resemble the standard disputed in Gundy.19 These
laws touch upon much of one’s daily life. They affect road safety,
federal buildings, consumer finance, complex securities laws, banking,
air travel, credit card transactions, and commercial trade, just to name
a few areas.20
The scholarship on nondelegation is voluminous.21 Even a
unanimous nondelegation case prompts a bevy of articles on its
holding, rationale, and impact.22 Given the split on the issue, the
importance of understanding Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent is
paramount. At the very least, the dissent showcases a willingness to
Justice Gorsuch that the Court should no longer apply Auer deference, despite precedent doing
so for almost eighty years and a recent Justice Scalia opinion upholding the deference. Id. at 2448.
18. Paul, 140 S. Ct. at 342.
19. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086) [hereinafter
Transcript of Oral Argument] (“[W]e’re told in one of the briefs that there are 300,000 such
regulations [made pursuant to capacious standards] . . . . So which, in fact, fall, as you said, within
your specially harsh rule? All of the 300,000? We’ll be busy in this Court for quite a while.”).
20. See infra notes 251–55 and accompanying text (providing examples of broad delegations
to executive agencies).
21. See generally Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the
Modern Administrative State, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147 (2017) (calling for a “realignment”
of the nondelegation doctrine that changes “the focus from the scope to the nature of the authority
legally assigned”); Joseph Postell & Paul D. Moreno, Not Dead Yet—Or Never Born? The Reality
of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 3 CONST. STUD. 41 (2018) (examining the importance of the
nondelegation doctrine prior to 1940 and describing “the historical shift from the enforcement of
the nondelegation doctrine to the accommodation of legislative delegation to the executive”);
Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. 379 (2017) (arguing that “[t]here was no golden age in which the courts enforced a robust
nondelegation doctrine” and “the federal courts never posed a significant obstacle to the
development of the administrative state and the delegation of extensive policymaking
authority”).
22. For an example, consider the scholarship following Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452 (2002) (noting that the
American Trucking case “brings the unanswered question to center stage: Should courts use
constitutional law or administrative law for requiring administrative standards?”); Gary Lawson,
Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 235 (2005) (criticizing the American Trucking decision for treating the
nondelegation doctrine “as a nullity”).
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reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine. Quite possibly, it provides the
method the Court will use to do so. This Note is one of the first
academic pieces to examine the evolution of nondelegation tests and
situate the Gorsuch test within the doctrine.23 It argues that the
Gorsuch test is stricter than any prior version and, if adopted, would
severely curtail Congress’s ability to give agencies power, thus limiting
the administrative state.
Part I outlines the case law and reviews past proposals for a
narrower nondelegation test than the intelligible principle test,
emphasizing that even as the administrative state grew exponentially,
no Court ever rigorously enforced the nondelegation principle. Part II
introduces the disputed statute in Gundy, the factual circumstances
underlying the case, the debates in the briefs and at oral argument, and
the three fractured opinions. The case’s history reveals that neither the
Court nor the parties significantly considered adopting a new test for
the nondelegation doctrine. Part III examines Justice Gorsuch’s
proposal in relation to previous tests and case law. Part IV considers
the weaknesses of the Gorsuch test, analyzing its destabilizing effects
on other broad statutes, the lack of doctrinal clarity, and difficult

23. When work began on this Note in the fall of 2019, no paper had been published on the
Gundy opinion. As expected, interest has grown. The scholarly work, however, is still in its
infancy. Only a few pieces have addressed Gundy significantly. See generally William D. Araiza,
Toward a Non-Delegation Doctrine That (Even) Progressives Could Like, 3 AM. CONST. SOC’Y
SUP. CT. REV. 211 (2020) (arguing in favor of a stricter nondelegation doctrine as a means to
advance progressive policies); Aditya Bamzai, Comment, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion:
Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164
(2019) (discussing the statutory interpretation involved and the relationship between Gundy and
Kisor); Gary Lawson, I’m Leavin’ It (All) up to You: Gundy and the (Sort-of) Resurrection of the
Subdelegation Doctrine, 2018–2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31 (2018–2019) (focusing on the future
of nondelegation with Justice Kavanaugh on the Court and the doctrine of subdelegation); Wayne
A. Logan, Gundy v. United States: Gunning for the Administrative State, 17 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
185 (2019) (advocating for a more stringent nondelegation doctrine for delegations of criminal
justice authority); Jennifer L. Mascott, Gundy v. United States: Reflections on the Court and the
State of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2018) (writing before the release
of the Court’s opinion to explain how the Justices viewed the nondelegation doctrine); Julian
Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding, 121 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3512154 [https://perma.cc/4BGA-N5SK] (taking a
comprehensive view on the nondelegation doctrine after noting Justice Gorsuch’s reliance on it
in Gundy); Jenny Roberts, Gundy and the Civil-Criminal Divide, 17 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207
(2019) (assessing the difference between nondelegation in the criminal and civil context after
Gundy). No academic article significantly discusses the Gorsuch test within nondelegation case
law or its implications. This Note contributes to the scholarship by framing the history of
nondelegation by tests. It also argues that Justice Gorsuch’s proposal not only seeks to revitalize
the nondelegation principle but also represents a stringent formulation compared to earlier tests,
both actual and proposed. Finally, it outlines why this move may be unwise and destabilizing.
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applications of the proposal. Ultimately, this Note concludes that these
weaknesses—destabilization, obscurity, and unmanageability—
caution against the test’s adoption.
I. NONDELEGATION TESTS
Until the late Gilded Age, the Court rarely invoked the
nondelegation doctrine. Even then, the Court never struck down a
statute until the Great Depression, doing so in only one year.24 For
much of its history, the Court employed different phrasing while
approaching nondelegation challenges, first using a “fill up the details”
standard before settling on the intelligible principle test. Irrespective
of the test’s exact wording, the result was the same: upholding the
statute.25 Proponents of a stricter doctrine have proposed new tests, but
these proposals have never gained traction.
A. “Fill Up the Details”
The First and Second Congresses delegated often, forcing courts
to confront nondelegation challenges early in American legal history.26
24. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
25. This Note does not attempt a historical gloss analysis of the nondelegation doctrine, but
the relationship between that recently blossoming area of scholarship and this age-old question
deserves more attention. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss
and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012) (outlining four general points about
historical gloss: (1) the role of historical practice in the separation of powers context; (2)
institutional acquiescence; (3) the difference between executive and legislative acquiescence; and
(4) the institutional context in any given area where the question arises). Specifically, Professors
Curt Bradley and Neil Siegel identified three conditions for gloss: “(1) governmental practice; (2)
longstanding duration; and (3) acquiescence, which we interpret below as requiring at least
reasonable stability in the practice but not necessarily inter-branch constitutional agreement.”
Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Madisonian Liquidation, and Originalism
Debate, 106 VA. L. REV. 1, 18 (2020). All three conditions seem present in the nondelegation
context. The practice of delegating power—or transferring it—is a governmental practice that has
continued for over two hundred years. Moreover, both branches have apparently accepted the
practice without issue. This idea finds further support in the justifications for gloss, namely: (1)
“deference to nonjudicial actors”; (2) limits on judicial capacity; (3) “Burkean consequentialism”
(the realities of governance); and (4) “reliance interests.” Curtis A. Bradley, Doing Gloss, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 59, 64–67 (2017). A similar point applies to liquidation, “which would allow postFounding historical practice to resolve indeterminacies in the Constitution’s original meaning and
thereby ‘fix’ its meaning.” Bradley & Siegel, supra, at 39. Again, the long-standing practice of
allowing Congress to delegate with broad standards, dating back to the Founding, favors
continuing to allow them to do so.
26. See Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 738–39
(1994) (reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY (1993)) (“[T]he
early history of the republic furnishes scant support for vigorous enforcement of a nondelegation
doctrine.”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI.

HALL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

THE GORSUCH TEST

9/17/2020 5:16 PM

181

Almost immediately after ratification, Congress created the
Departments of Treasury, War, and State; the Post Office; and a system
of patent approvals entrusted to different departments.27 Early statutes
showcased broad delegations to enact rules or exercise wide discretion.
One law authorized military pensions “under such regulations as the
President of the United States may direct.”28 On a later occasion,
Congress granted the president the power to actually fix pay for all
those wounded or disabled in battle, provided it was not more than a
set maximum amount.29
Eventually, one of these broad delegations was challenged, and
the Supreme Court decided the first nondelegation challenge, Cargo of
the Brig Aurora v. United States,30 in 1813.31 Three years prior, Congress

L. REV. 1721, 1735–36 (2002) (listing a series of delegation statutes enacted by the First and
Second Congresses). Originalist support for nondelegation is fiercely debated. See, e.g., ROBERT
H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 92–93 (1941) (asserting that the
Constitution contemplated a large measure of delegation); Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation, 12
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 718, 719 (2019) (“I argue that the Nondelegation Doctrine has a firm
foundation in the Constitution’s original meaning.”); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original
Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 332 (2002) (“There is something very fundamental—indeed, almost
primal—about the nondelegation doctrine that keeps resuscitating it when any rational observer
would have issued a ‘code blue’ long ago.”); Posner & Vermeule, supra, at 1722 (“The
nondelegation position lacks any foundation in constitutional text and structure, in standard
originalist sources, or in sound economic and political theory.”); Sunstein, supra note 7, at 322
(“The Constitution does grant legislative power to Congress, but it does not in terms forbid
delegations of that power, and I have been unable to find any indication, in the founding era, that
such delegations were originally thought to be banned.”). The actual Vesting Clause of Article I,
§ 1 does not prohibit delegation, and the concept of delegation was barely mentioned in the
Constitutional Convention, the Ratification debates, The Federalist Papers, and early
governmental practices. See Posner & Vermeule, supra, at 1732–36 (discussing the lack of
historical support for the nondelegation doctrine); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and House of Representatives.”). This Note, however, focuses on the evolution of the
nondelegation doctrine, leaving aside this robust scholarly debate.
27. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 34 (2012).
28. An Act Providing for the Payment of the Invalid Pensioners of the United States, ch. 24,
1 Stat. 95 (1789).
29. Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 719 (1969)
(“[T]he President [can] fix the pay, not more than prescribed maxima, for military personnel
wounded or disabled in the line of duty.”); see also An Act for Regulating the Military
Establishment of the United States, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 119, 121 (1790) (providing that wounded
military personnel “shall be placed on the list of the invalids of the United States, at such rate of
pay, and under such regulations as shall be directed by the President of the United States . . . .”).
30. Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States (The Brig Aurora), 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382
(1813).
31. Id. at 382. Compare Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (presenting The Brig Aurora as a nondelegation case), and Keith E. Whittington,
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passed a law permitting the president to lift an embargo if France or
Britain ceased violating American neutral commerce.32 The owner of
the ship argued that Congress “could not transfer the legislative power
to the President,” as it would give the proclamation “the force of a
law.”33 Congress could not have intended this result.34 The opposing
attorney rejected that contention, arguing the president could only
determine the facts “upon which the law should go into effect.”35
Justice William Johnson delivered the opinion, which never mentioned
the word “delegation,” the Vesting Clause, the president, or the
separation of powers.36 Rather, the Court approved Congress’s
exercise of discretion to revive the act “either expressly or
conditionally, as their judgment should direct.”37
The Court, under Chief Justice John Marshall, addressed
nondelegation in Wayman v. Southard,38 thirty-eight years after the
Constitution’s ratification. At issue was the Process Act, which
required federal courts to adopt state procedure while also permitting
“such alterations and additions as the said Courts respectively shall, in
their discretion . . . think proper.”39 The defendant objected to the
practice as an unlawful delegation of legislative authority that Congress
“has not the power to make.”40 Marshall agreed that Congress could
not delegate “exclusively” legislative power, but it could “delegate to
others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself.”41 He
wrote:
The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those
important subjects which must be entirely regulated by the legislature
itself from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be

Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1291 (2009) (arguing that the
Marshall Court upheld the challenged provision as not a “prohibited delegation”), with Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1737 (arguing that The Brig Aurora does not stand for the
nondelegation principle).
32. The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 383–84.
33. Id. at 386.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 387.
36. See id. at 388 (devoting only one paragraph to upholding the act by finding the law was
not “without limitation”).
37. Id.
38. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
39. Id. at 41.
40. Id. at 42.
41. Id. at 43.
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made, and power given to those who are to act under such general
provisions to fill up the details.42

Therefore, the Court needed to inquire into the extent of the
powers given to the recipients by the law itself. The Process Act, the
Court concluded, posed no constitutional issue.43
Despite the dozens of times the issue was raised, no litigant
successfully prevailed on a nondelegation challenge at the state level
until the mid-nineteenth century or at the federal level until almost the
mid-twentieth century.44 In the interim, the American administrative
state ballooned. In 1887, Congress created the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the first independent agency of its kind.45 Within the next
few decades, it also established the Federal Trade Commission and the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.46 By the Great
Depression, it had created larger agencies, such as the National Labor
Relations Board, the Federal Communications Commission, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission.47 In response, the Supreme
Court faced an increasing number of nondelegation cases beginning at
the end of the nineteenth century and continuing to present day.
In 1892, almost eighty years after Wayman,48 the Supreme Court
considered the nondelegation issue again in Field v. Clark.49 The
Marshall Field & Company challenged the authority conferred to the
president under § 3 of the Tariff Act of 1890.50 Under the act, the
president could suspend the tariffs of certain countries if the trading

42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. Posner and Vermeule observe that “[m]odern commentators have sometimes read the
last sentence of this passage as though Marshall were attempting a turgid explication of the
‘intelligible principle’ test.” Posner & Vermeule, supra note 26, at 1738. They disagree and argue
that Marshall’s quote was never intended to become any form of the intelligible principle test. Id.
at 1738–39. Rather, Marshall was simply drawing a line between exclusive powers and delegable
powers. Id. If their reading is accurate, then neither the intelligible principle nor the Gorsuch test
would be needed in adjudicating nondelegation challenges. It would instead only require a simple,
formalist application.
44. See Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 21, at 419 (comparing all nondelegation cases
from 1825 to 1940, with all unconstitutional delegation findings over the same period).
45. Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 41.
46. Id. at 42.
47. Id.
48. See Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 21, at 396 (“The Court had remarkably little to
say regarding the delegation of legislative power from the late Marshall Court through the
remainder of the nineteenth century.”).
49. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
50. Id. at 650–51.
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country agreed to some reciprocal trade agreement.51 Attorneys for
Marshall Field argued that the ability to tax was inherently legislative,
pursuant to the Taxing Clause of Article I.52 Rejecting the argument,
the Court noted that Congress, not the president, chose to tax the
products.53 All the president could do was make the factual
determination on whether a trade agreement rendered the tariffs
unequal.54 Congress needed discretion and efficiency to legislate, and
hundreds of laws on the books reflected this truism. When the opinion
was handed down, Field was the Court’s clearest articulation of the
nondelegation principle. Far from the oblique reference in The Brig
Aurora or the esoteric line drawing in Wayman, the opinion clearly
stated that Congress could not delegate “legislative power” and,
moreover, that the nondelegation principle was “vital to the integrity
and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
Constitution.”55
However, Field’s robust elaboration of nondelegation had no
practical effect on the outcome of nondelegation challenges, as the
Court only occasionally used some form of the “fill up the details”
approach when deciding nondelegation disputes. In such disputes, the
Court found that the ability of the secretary of the treasury to control
certain imports was “proper” because it entailed only “[t]he delegation
of details.”56 Similarly, it considered the authority granted to the
Internal Revenue Service commissioner to create stamps for margarine
packages and to the secretary of the Bureau of Labor Statistics to
inspect mines as a mere “matter of detail.”57 And it found that a law
allowing the secretary of agriculture to “establish[] certain rules for the
purpose of regulating the use and occupancy of the public forest”
amounted to filling in “administrative detail[s].”58

51. Id. at 680.
52. Id. at 695.
53. Id. at 693 (“What the President was required to do was simply in execution of the act of
Congress.”).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 692.
56. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 489 (1904).
57. In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526, 533 (1897) (“[T]he designation by the Commissioner of the
particular marks and brands to be used was a mere matter of detail.”); St. Louis Consol. Coal Co.
v. Illinois, 185 U.S. 203, 211 (1902) (“It is obviously necessary that the number of inspections per
year shall be determined by . . . some executive officer[,] [a]s it is clearly a matter of detail . . . .”).
58. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 509, 516 (1911).
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B. “Intelligible Principle”
The Supreme Court’s adherence to any form of a “fill up the
details” standard was short-lived. Even before the Court announced
the intelligible principle test, earlier cases released contemporaneously
with “fill up the details” cases forecasted a change in approach with
broad phrases, such as “general rule.”59 Congress gave the Interstate
Commerce Commission authority to regulate commerce by conducting
reports, setting up a uniform system of accounts, and prohibiting
methods of accounting as the Commission deemed fit.60 In Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co.,61 the Court believed
that the statute was not a delegation of legislative authority, finding
instead that the statute provided “general rules for . . . guidance.”62
Similarly, the Court upheld an Ohio act that assigned an administrative
body the “power to ascertain the facts and conditions to which the
policy and principles apply.”63 So long as the act furnished a standard
and avoided “arbitrary judgment, whim and caprice,” it was not
constitutionally deficient. 64 Congress was also allowed to grant power
to the secretary of labor to take “aliens of certain classes” into custody
with a warrant because the “background of a declared policy” proved
“sufficiently definite.”65 Lastly, the Court used such capacious
formulations as “primary standard” and “general rule” in upholding
the power of the secretary of war to control bridges for the safe
navigation of waterways.66
The pivotal case for nondelegation came in 1928. In J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,67 the government brought suit
under § 315 of Title III of the Tariff Act of 1922, which allowed the
president to adjust tariffs to equalize the differences between foreign
countries.68 The act established guidelines for the president to consider,
including the differences in production, such as “wages, costs of

59. See Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 386 (1907) (“[Congress] stopped,
however, with this declaration of a general rule and imposed upon the Secretary of War the duty
of ascertaining what particular cases came within the rule prescribed . . . .” (emphasis added)).
60. Interstate Com. Comm’n v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 203–04 (1912).
61. Interstate Com. Comm’n v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194 (1912).
62. Id. at 215.
63. Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 245 (1915).
64. Id.
65. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 36–37, 40 (1924).
66. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364, 385–86 (1907).
67. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
68. Id. at 401.
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material, and other items in costs of production”; the differences in
selling prices; various foreign policy interests; and “other advantages
or disadvantages in competition.”69 The Hampton company, subject to
a higher tariff rate by presidential proclamation, argued that the act
amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of power to the
president.70 The solicitor general countered that Congress only
assigned “a fact-finding power” to the president, which presented no
problem under the current doctrine, and cited a line of cases to support
the proposition, including The Brig Aurora, Wayman, and Field.71 The
Court agreed with the United States. So long as Congress prescribed
“an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix
such rates [was] directed to conform, such legislative action [was] not a
forbidden delegation of legislative power.”72 The case bore similarity,
the Court asserted, to Field, where the president had the duty to
control reciprocal agreements.73 Later courts would derive the
intelligible principle test from Hampton, upholding a law if it had an
“intelligible principle” for the agency to follow.74
Only in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan75 and A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States76 did the nondelegation doctrine become
a basis for striking down a statute—the National Industrial Recovery
Act (“NIRA”). In Panama Refining, the Court considered a challenge
to § 9(c) of NIRA, the hot oil provision. This provision allowed the
president to ban the transportation of interstate and foreign commerce
of petroleum and petroleum products when in excess of the amounted
permitted by state law or under regulation by a state agency.77 The
Court stated that though Congress had the “necessary resources of
flexibility and practicality,” it could not pass legislative power to
another branch of government.78
69. Id. at 401–02.
70. Id. at 395–96, 400.
71. Id. at 398–99.
72. Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 409–10.
74. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785 (1948) (using Hampton’s intelligible
principle test to confirm that “[i]t is not necessary that Congress supply administrative officials
with a specific formula for their guidance” (quoting Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409)).
75. Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
76. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). For background,
see generally AMITY SHLAES, THE FORGOTTEN MAN: A NEW HISTORY OF THE GREAT
DEPRESSION 214–45 (2007) (describing the legal, legislative, and social context behind Schechter).
77. Pan. Refin. Co., 293 U.S. at 406–07.
78. Id. at 421.
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In Schechter, § 3 of NIRA fared no better, as a unanimous Court
determined that it also constituted an impermissible delegation of
legislative authority for similar reasons as § 9(c). NIRA granted the
president or trade groups, as approved by the president, the power to
establish “codes of fair competition,” so long as the codes imposed no
inequitable restrictions on membership to the groups, did not promote
monopolies, and did not hurt small businesses.79 The Live Poultry Code
was promulgated pursuant to NIRA, and the Schechters were
convicted for violating eighteen counts of the code.80 In siding with the
Schechters, the Court examined whether the term “codes of fair
competition” sufficiently limited the scope of authority.81 NIRA never
specified a definition for “codes of fair competition,” and neither the
common law concept of “unfair competition” nor a similar statutory
term in the Federal Trade Commission Act could be read into the
statute.82 The stated goal of NIRA, to effectuate certain policy
objectives,83 provided too much discretion to the executive.84
As quickly as the doctrine sprouted to life, it withered.85 For
nondelegation, the Court kept its broader formulation of delegable
functions but returned to underenforcing the principle, even as
Congress conveyed more and more power to agencies. In Currin v.
Wallace,86 the Court examined the Tobacco Inspection Act of 1935,

79. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 521–22.
80. Id. at 519, 22.
81. Id. at 519, 521–25.
82. Id. at 530–32.
83. Id. at 531 n.9.
84. Id. at 538–39.
85. Following Roosevelt’s court-packing attempt in 1937, a constitutional law revolution
occurred. Cf. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 120–46 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 6th ed. 2016) (contextualizing the constitutional revolution within the general
change in jurisprudence around World War II). See generally Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson,
Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001) (debating the effects of
the revolution in the new century). With the revolution came major changes in other doctrines,
most famously to the Commerce Clause, and the end of heightened scrutiny for certain economic
liberties under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)
(holding that Congress may regulate activity “if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce” regardless of whether it is “direct” or “indirect”); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (finding that “the prohibition of the shipment interstate of goods
produced under the forbidden substandard labor conditions is within the constitutional authority
of Congress”); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding that
Congress may regulate intrastate activities “if they have such a close and substantial relation to
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from
burdens and obstructions”).
86. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
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which authorized the secretary of agriculture to establish standards of
tobacco and designate markets where it could be purchased and sold.87
Though facially similar to NIRA, the Tobacco Inspection Act was a
permissible delegation of power.88 Similarly, the newly enacted
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which granted the secretary of
agriculture the ability to fix a quota for crop production and allotment
among states and farms, had enough “specified factors” to “protect
against arbitrary action.”89 The comparable Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937 required the secretary of agriculture to fix and
equalize the prices to be paid to producers for milk. It created no
issue.90 The purpose of the act, “to establish and maintain such orderly
marketing conditions for agricultural commodities in interstate
commerce,” gave sufficient guidance to the secretary.91 Even powers
granted to a committee of private industry citizens, soundly rejected in
Schechter, encountered no resistance.92 It was constitutional for such
committees to simply gather facts given that Congress could rely on
experts to determine social and economic conditions.93
In the immediate post-1937 case law, the Court universally
approved broad delegations of power, but not usually with a clear
formulation of how to approach the problem. The Court continued to
cite Hampton, even though the words “intelligible principle” appeared
only intermittently.94 Critics of the intelligible principle test understand
this lack of consistency as evidence that the Hampton Court never
intended that the intelligible principle test would become the
doctrine.95 But this distinction is somewhat of a red herring. For several
87. Id. at 1.
88. Id. at 15–18.
89. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 48–49 (1939).
90. United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 574 (1939).
91. Id. at 575–76.
92. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm’r of the Wage and Hour Div. of the Dep’t of Lab., 312
U.S. 126, 135–36, 142–44 (1941). The fact that “boards as fact-finding agencies” comprised of
citizens could develop congressional policy in pursuit of a statutory standard resembles a sub
silentio overruling of Schechter. Id. at 144.
93. Id. at 145–46.
94. See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944) (holding that delegation of
congressional power is valid so long as the prescribed standards are “sufficiently definite and
precise” to determine “whether the will of Congress has been obeyed”).
95. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2139 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[I]t
seems plain enough that [Chief Justice Taft] sought only to explain the operation of these
traditional tests; he gave no hint of a wish to overrule or revise them.”); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n
of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 81–82 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The analysis in Field and J.W.
Hampton may have been premised on an incorrect assessment of the statutes . . . . To the extent
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decades, the Court never adopted clear language, using different
phrasing each time.96 There was often a coupling of some “guiding
principle” with a need to “fill up the details.” The ideas mirrored two
sides of the same issue. When a statute outlined an intelligible
principle, the agency, of course, had to fill in the details in accordance
with that principle. When an agency had to “fill up the details,” it did
so pursuant to the standard of the law. It is a different matter entirely
to suggest that the word “detail” carried significant weight, such that it
differed from policy altogether.
Eventually, later cases would clearly embrace and faithfully
employ the intelligible principle test.97 If the statute had an intelligible
principle to guide agency discretion, then it passed muster. As for
Panama Refining and Schechter, while never repudiated, they have
effectively become a dead letter—a symbolic check that courts have
mentioned but never given full consideration, no matter how similar
the scrutinized law was to NIRA.98
More recently, the pattern of upholding broad delegations has
continued, even as opponents of current nondelegation jurisprudence
have emerged. In Mistretta v. United States,99 the Court examined the
power of the Sentencing Commission, promulgated pursuant to the
our modern jurisprudence treats them as sanctioning the ‘delegation’ of such power, it
misunderstands their historical foundations and expands the Court’s holdings.”).
96. See, e.g., Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortg. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 276
(1933) (upholding Congress’s delegation of power to the Federal Radio Commission “to exercise
the administrative judgment essential in applying legislative standards to a host of instances”);
United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932) (“The proviso does not
delegate legislative power but confers administrative functions entirely valid within principles
established by numerous decisions of this court . . . .”).
97. See, e.g., Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785 (1948) (referring with approval to
the choice to “leav[e] to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within
prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature
is to apply” (quoting Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935))).
98. For examples of later cases upholding laws like NIRA, see Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S.
1, 6 (1939) (finding constitutional the Tobacco Inspection Act of 1935, which authorized the
“Secretary of Agriculture . . . to investigate the handling, inspection and marketing of tobacco
and to establish standards by which its type, grade, size, condition, or other characteristics may be
determined”); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Connally, 337 F.
Supp. 737, 762 (D.D.C. 1971) (“Given a legislative enactment, there have not been any Supreme
Court rulings holding statutes unconstitutional for excessive delegation of legislative power since
the Panama Refining and Schechter cases invalidated provisions of the National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1933.” (emphasis added)); see also Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the
Administrative State: Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 839 n.214
(1997) (“The Court has not struck down a statute on nondelegation grounds since the New Deal.
Instead, the Court has upheld a variety of open-ended statutes over nondelegation challenges.”).
99. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, to issue then-binding guidelines that
applied to all persons convicted in the federal court system.100 Despite
the Commission’s immense authority, the eight-Justice majority found
the act had prescribed a sufficient intelligible principle to constrain its
power.101 Only Justice Antonin Scalia disagreed.102
Justice Scalia, though, later wrote the unanimous opinion of the
Court in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns103 upholding a broad
grant of authority to the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”).104 Under § 109(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, the EPA must set
primary ambient air quality standards to “protect the public health
with an adequate margin of safety.”105 When construed to avoid using
a cost-benefit analysis, the standard had no constitutional deficiency.106
It did not differ significantly from past precedent, Scalia observed.107
From Mistretta to Gundy, the Court, either unanimously or with only
one dissent, upheld broad delegations to the secretary of
transportation to “establish a schedule of fees” for all “persons
operating” pipeline facilities,108 to the attorney general to establish
categories of criminal conduct for different drugs,109 and to the
president to “restrict the death sentence to murders in which certain
aggravating circumstances have been established.”110
100. Id. at 367–68.
101. Id. at 379.
102. He emphasized that nondelegation had thus far focused on “the degree of generality
contained in the authorization,” but the powers of the Commission pertained to legislative
functions, thus constituting an impermissible delegation of power. Id. at 419–20 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
103. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 457 (2001).
104. Id. at 465.
105. Id. at 476.
106. See id. at 471 (“The text of § 109(b), interpreted in its statutory and historical context
and with appreciation for its importance to the CAA as a whole, unambiguously bars cost
considerations from the NAAQS-setting process, and thus ends the matter for us as well as the
EPA.”).
107. See id. at 473–74 (comparing the “limits on the EPA’s discretion . . . to the ones
approved in Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991)” and to the provision of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 “which the Court upheld in Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Institute, 488 U.S. 607, 646 (1980)”).
108. Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 214 (1989).
109. Touby, 500 U.S. at 162. The Court notes:
The [Controlled Substance] Act establishes five categories or “schedules” of controlled
substances, the manufacture, possession, and distribution of which the Act regulates or
prohibits . . . . [Section] 201(a) of the Act authorizes the Attorney General to add or
remove substances, or to move a substance from one schedule to another.
Id.
110. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 769 (1996).
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C. New Proposals
Over the past fifty years, several groups have unsuccessfully
advocated to revive the nondelegation principle. Interestingly, the first
efforts came not from the Supreme Court but from academics, who
postulated that the unchecked ability of Congress to delegate was
undemocratic.111 Scholar John Hart Ely delivered a forceful critique.
He argued that the vast majority of legislating comes from “faceless
bureaucrats” that “[were] neither elected nor reelected.”112 For the
really “hard issues,” representatives “shrewdly prefer[red] not to have
to stand up and be counted but rather to let some executive-branch
bureaucrat . . . take the inevitable political heat.”113 Such a system,
condoned by the Supreme Court, eroded people’s faith in
democracy.114
Eventually, the scholarly frustration resonated with members of
the Supreme Court. Although writing only in concurrence or dissent,
then-associate Justice William Rehnquist led the push, first in
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Institute (Benzene),115 then again in American Textile Manufacturers
Institute v. Donovan (Cotton Dust).116 He, not Justice Gorsuch, was the

111. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 132 (1980) (“[B]y refusing to legislate, our legislators are escaping the sort of
accountability that is crucial to the intelligible functioning of a democratic republic.”); JAMES O.
FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 93 (1978) (“[A] principal office of the nondelegation doctrine is to ensure that
controverted issues of policy and opinion be resolved . . . by those who draw their special
character from a representative relationship to the people.”); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF
LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 131 (1969) (“Much fun has been
made of the myth the courts tried to create, that agencies were merely ‘filling in the details’ of
Acts of Congress.”); Bernard Schwartz, Of Administrators and Philosopher-Kings: The Republic,
the Laws, and Delegations of Power, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 446 (1977) (“[I]n the absence of
meaningful standards, administrative discretion is left completely at large.”); Richard B. Stewart,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1672 (1975) (“These
principles [of democratic government] would, however, be deprived of all practical significance
were the legislature permitted to delegate its lawmaking power in gross.”); J. Skelly Wright,
Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 583 (1972) (“[T]he delegation doctrine retains an
important potential as a check on the exercise of unbounded, standardless discretion by
administrative agencies.”).
112. ELY, supra note 111, at 131.
113. Id. at 132 (internal quotations omitted).
114. Id.; see also id. at 134 (“If we can just get our legislators to legislate we’ll be able to
understand their goals well enough. I’m not saying we may not still end up with a fair number of
clowns as representatives, but at least then it will be because clowns are what we deserve.”).
115. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
116. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan (Cotton Dust), 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
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first Justice to propose a new test for nondelegation, though the test
never gained enough support to form a majority.117
Both the Benzene and Cotton Dust cases involved provisions of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The actual statutory text has
been described as “a mass of confused and conflicting language.”118 In
Benzene, Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence focused on § 6(b)(5) of the
act that enabled the secretary of labor to establish standards for “toxic
materials or harmful physical agents . . . to the extent feasible,” so that
no employee would be harmed by regular exposure.119 Unlike the
Court’s previous nondelegation opinions, Justice Rehnquist began
with a discussion of constitutional principles.120 He based his
understanding in John Locke’s Second Treatise of Civil Government,
where Locke wrote that the legislative power cannot be transferred to
another authority.121 After using Locke to frame the historical basis for
his view, Rehnquist formulated the “important functions” of
nondelegation that each law must pass: (1) it must be consistent with
“orderly governmental administration” ensuring “important choices of
social policy are made by Congress”; (2) the recipient of the authority
must be guided by an intelligible principle; and (3) courts must be able
to meaningfully review if an agency has exceeded that standard.122 In
announcing his test, Rehnquist did not jettison the intelligible principle
test. He merely added to its requirements.
As applied in Benzene, the grant to the secretary of labor failed on
each count.123 The decision as to which regulations should be enacted
was a legislative policy choice.124 The feasibility standard had no
guiding principle, and the word “feasibility” left the courts without

117. See Jay S. Bybee & Tuan N. Samahon, William Rehnquist, The Separation of Powers,
and the Riddle of the Sphinx, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1735, 1750 (2006) (noting that although Justice
Rehnquist was never in the majority, he “attempted to use the nondelegation doctrine to hold
Congress’s ‘feet to the fire’ by forcing Congress to be conscientious”).
118. KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 2.6 (6th ed. 2018).
119. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 671 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)
(2018)).
120. See id. at 672–73 (invoking John Locke, the Framers, and the Federalist Papers). Later,
Justice Gorsuch adopted a similar opening in his dissent in Gundy. See Gundy v. United States,
139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133–35 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (referring to the Framers, Chief Justice
Marshall, and John Locke).
121. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 672–73 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 685–86.
123. Id. at 686.
124. Id.
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meaningful judicial review.125 Rehnquist applied the same test in his
dissenting opinion for a similar case a year later, Cotton Dust, reaching
the same conclusion.126 Ultimately, in both Benzene and Cotton Dust,
the majority decided the case on grounds other than nondelegation,127
though the majority in Benzene based its reading, in part, on
constitutional concerns.128 In Cotton Dust, Rehnquist convinced Chief
Justice Burger to join his reasoning,129 and the ultimate majority had
only a bare five votes.130
The fractured votes, invocation of nondelegation, and forceful
presentation by Justice Rehnquist ostensibly presaged a revival of the
nondelegation principle.131 At least for the next thirty-five years, such
predications were wrong.132 Rehnquist’s three-part test never found
majority support, and the Court routinely upheld broad grants of
power to agencies.133 Justice Rehnquist found himself instead agreeing
with the intelligible principle concept.134
Before his confirmation, then-Judge Gorsuch assessed the
constitutionality of the same statute involved in Gundy, explained
below, and he raised similar concerns about nondelegation in his
dissent from a denial of rehearing en banc.135 Though in a less-

125. Id.
126. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan (Cotton Dust), 452 U.S. 490, 543–48 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 508–09 (majority opinion) (holding that the delegating statute only precluded
agency adoption of a health-based rule absent a finding of “feasibility”); Benzene, 448 U.S. at
614–15 (holding that the delegating statute precluded agency adoption of a health-based rule
absent a finding that the pre-existing situation created a “a significant health risk”); see also
HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 118, § 2.6 (discussing the holdings of Benzene and Cotton Dust).
128. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 646 (“If the Government were correct . . . the statute would make
such a ‘sweeping delegation of legislative power’ that it might be unconstitutional . . . .”).
129. Cotton Dust, 452 U.S. at 543 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 492 (majority opinion).
131. HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 118, § 2.6 (“Benzene and Cotton Dust seemed to
foreshadow increased Supreme Court reliance on some version of the nondelegation doctrine.”).
132. Id. (“Since 1989, however, the Court has upheld five broad delegations of power—one
to an independent agency, two to executive agencies, one to the Attorney General and one to the
President.”).
133. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 458 (2001) (“Statutes need not
provide a determinate criterion for saying how much of a regulated harm is too much to avoid
delegating legislative power.”).
134. See id. at 472 (joining Part III of the majority opinion reaffirming the intelligible
principle test).
135. See United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 670 (10th Cir. 2015) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“There’s ample evidence, too, that the framers of
the Constitution thought the compartmentalization of legislative power not just a tool of good
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developed manner, Gorsuch pushed for a stronger application of the
nondelegation doctrine. He drew a contrast between “most traditional
delegation tests” and the recent intelligible principle test that the Court
adopted.136 A delegation “run riot,” he explained, was “inimical to the
people’s liberty and our constitutional design.”137 Still a circuit judge,
Gorsuch could do little to change binding precedent—until he was
elevated to the Supreme Court, where he would refine his position into
a more concrete proposal.
II. GUNDY V. UNITED STATES
The statute at issue in Gundy was the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act (“SORNA”).138 Throughout the case, both the
government and the defendant focused on whether the disputed
provision of SORNA had an intelligible principle. At no point did
either the parties or any Justice suggest adopting a new framework for
applying the nondelegation doctrine. That issue was not briefed, except
by one amicus,139 and was never debated in oral argument.
Nonetheless, Justice Gorsuch offered a new test for assessing
nondelegation.
A. The Gundy Case
Congress enacted SORNA as part of a growing federal
intervention into policing sex crimes, which was previously the purview
of the states.140 SORNA expanded existing registration requirements
for sex offenders.141 Now, under SORNA, a sex offender must register

government or necessary to protect the authority of Congress from encroachment by the
Executive but essential to the preservation of the people’s liberty.”).
136. Id. at 672.
137. Id. at 677.
138. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019).
139. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
140. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121 (explaining that every state and the District of Columbia
had a sex offender registration statute but the statutes “varied along many dimensions” before
SORNA).
141. Id. (“SORNA makes ‘more uniform and effective’ the prior ‘patchwork’ of sex-offender
registration systems. The Act’s express ‘purpose’ is to ‘protect the public’ . . . by ‘establish[ing] a
comprehensive national system for [their] registration.’” (alterations in original) (citations
omitted) (first quoting Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 435 (2012); then quoting 34 U.S.C.
§ 20901 (2018)).
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in every state where he lives, is a student, or is an employee.142 The
registration system has two main provisions. Subsection (b) provides
the “general rule.”143 If a sex offender is in prison, that person must
register before completing his sentence.144 If the individual is not
incarcerated, then he must register within three days of being
sentenced.145 Subsection (b) affects only offenders sentenced after the
passage of SORNA, the “post-Act offenders.”146 Subsection (d)
catches all those not included above. It states:
The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the
applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders
convicted before the enactment of this chapter or its implementation
in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the registration
of any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders
who are unable to comply with subsection (b).147

Subsection (d) was intended to cover the “pre-Act offenders,” some
500,000 people.148 Pursuant to SORNA, the attorney general
established a rule to apply the registration requirements to the pre-Act
offenders.149
On October 3, 2005, Herman Gundy entered an Alford plea in
Maryland state court for a second-degree sexual offense.150 He was
sentenced to twenty years in prison and five years of probation, with
ten of the twenty years suspended.151 Later, Gundy confessed to
violating his federal supervised release.152 He received a two-year
prison sentence to be served directly after his Maryland sentence for
his sexual offense.153 Eventually, Gundy was moved to a reentry facility
in the Bronx, and he was released in 2012, becoming a resident of the
142. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(a) (“A sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current,
in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the
offender is a student.”).
143. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2132 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
147. 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d).
148. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122, 2143.
149. Id. at 2122.
150. United States v. Gundy, No. 13 Crim. 8, 2013 WL 2247147, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), rev’d
804 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2015), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019); see also Brief for Petitioner at 13, Gundy,
139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
151. Gundy, 2013 WL 2247147, at *1.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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state.154 Afterward, Gundy continued to live in New York but failed to
register as a sex offender under SORNA.155 The U.S. Attorney’s Office
for the Southern District of New York brought charges against him
soon thereafter.156
As Professor Jennifer Mascott has noted, Gundy was “unusual”
from the beginning.157 Gundy was represented by a public defender.158
The petition for certiorari raised four questions, totaled only twenty
pages, and dedicated a mere two pages to whether SORNA involved
an unconstitutional delegation.159 There was no circuit split.160 In fact,
eleven courts of appeals had rejected similar claims.161 The Supreme
Court had also declined fifteen times to review SORNA nondelegation
claims.162 It had addressed the exact same provision in Reynolds v.
United States,163 albeit answering a different question.164 At first, the
solicitor general’s office did not even file a brief opposing certiorari,
only doing so once instructed.165 Still, the then nine-member Court

154. Id.
155. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122 (“After his release from prison in 2012, Gundy came to live in
New York. But he never registered there as a sex offender. A few years later, he was convicted
for failing to register, in violation of § 2250.”).
156. Gundy, 2013 WL 2247147, at *1.
157. See Mascott, supra note 23, at 8 (“From the start, this case had a relatively unusual
posture for a case in which the Court would eventually grant review.”).
158. Id. (“[R]ather than a case involving a well-known corporate entity, a state, or a federal
actor or a case with clients represented by a well-known Supreme Court litigator, Gundy
petitioned in forma pauperis represented by a local public defender.”).
159. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Gundy, 138 S. Ct. at 1–20 (No. 17-6086); see also
Mascott, supra note 23, at 8 (“Gundy initially petitioned for certiorari review on four separate
questions, the fourth of which was his nondelegation claim.”).
160. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2122 (“The District Court and Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit rejected that claim, as had every other court (including eleven Courts of Appeals) to
consider the issue.”).
161. See Mascott, supra note 23, at 12 (“[T]he [Brief in Opposition] cited eleven courts of
appeals that had rejected such claims.”).
162. See id. at 12–13 (“The next page of the [Brief in Opposition’s] argument included a string
citation to fifteen occasions on which the Supreme Court had denied certiorari review to SORNA
nondelegation claims.”).
163. Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012).
164. Id. at 436, 439; see also Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2124 (“This is not the first time this Court
has had to interpret § 20913(d). In Reynolds, the Court considered whether SORNA’s registration
requirements applied of their own force to pre-Act offenders or instead applied only once the
Attorney General said they did.”).
165. Mascott, supra note 23, at 8.
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granted the writ of certiorari on March 5, 2018 as to whether SORNA
impermissibly delegated power to the attorney general.166
After the Court agreed to hear the case, petitioners, respondents,
and thirteen amici filed briefs.167 Gundy stressed that the restraints
imposed by the nondelegation doctrine should be particularly
restrictive in the criminal context.168 He claimed that SORNA failed
the intelligible principle test by neglecting to provide a standard for the
policy.169 The government argued that Congress did not violate the
nondelegation principle, as it supplied an intelligible principle by
making the attorney general register the pre-Act offenders “to the
maximum extent feasible.”170 All the amici who filed briefs supported
Gundy,171 including, to name a few, the Cato Institute,172 the National
Association of Federal Defenders,173 the American Civil Liberties
Union,174 and the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty.175 Of all the amici,

166. United States v. Gundy, 804 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 86 U.S.L.W. 3438
(U.S. Mar. 5, 2018) (No. 17-6086).
167. Mascott, supra note 23, at 7.
168. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 150, at 17–23. Repeatedly, Gundy emphasized the
criminal nature of SORNA in the hopes that the Court would account for the liberty interest in
the nondelegation context. Whether the doctrine applies differently in the criminal context
remained unclear at the time of his brief and remains so today. See F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa
Byrne Hessick, Nondelegation and Criminal Law, 107 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 5 n.9) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (noting that no prior scholarship “has
addressed specifically how the principles underlying the nondelegation doctrine apply to criminal
laws”). In an earlier opinion on SORNA while a judge on the Tenth Circuit, then-Judge Gorsuch
made a similar point:
It’s easy enough to see why a stricter rule would apply in the criminal arena. The
criminal conviction and sentence represent the ultimate intrusions on personal liberty
and carry with them the stigma of the community’s collective condemnation—
something quite different than holding someone liable for a money judgment . . . .
United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 672–73 (10th Cir. 2015) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc). Ultimately, Justice Gorsuch did not pick up this thread when
dissenting in Gundy. See Hessick & Hessick, supra, at 5 (“[N]one of the justices in Gundy
grappled with [the criminal law delegation] issues.”).
169. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 150, at 23.
170. Brief for the United States at 13, United States v. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (No. 176086) [hereinafter Brief for United States].
171. Mascott, supra note 23, at 7.
172. Brief for the Cato Institute et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner, Gundy,
139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086).
173. Brief for the National Association of Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting
the Petitioner, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086).
174. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting the
Petitioner, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086).
175. Brief for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae Supporting the
Petitioner, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086).
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only the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence advocated replacing
the intelligible principle test.176
The Court heard oral argument for the case on October 2, 2018
with only eight Justices on the bench.177 Soon-to-be-Justice Kavanaugh
would be confirmed four days later.178 If there was seemingly little
appetite to unsettle doctrine in the petition and amici filings, that only
continued at oral argument. The members of the Court gave little
indication that they were considering adopting a new test.
Sarah Baumgartel, counsel for Gundy, never contended that the
intelligible principle test insufficiently enforced the nondelegation
doctrine. Rather, from the beginning, she posited that the “lack of
standard” altogether doomed SORNA.179 She met quick resistance,
beginning with Chief Justice Roberts, who noted that the government
claimed to have a standard that satisfied the intelligible principle test.180
The intelligible principle was to “apply the . . . requirements in the law
to the maximum extent feasible.”181 Justice Sonia Sotomayor extracted
a concession: the Court had routinely read statutory limitations to
avoid constitutionality problems.182 Baumgartel then admitted, after
further questioning from Justice Kagan, that § 20913(d), if read with a
feasibility standard, would likely not pose any constitutional issues.183
Thus, Gundy’s argument necessitated reading SORNA to allow the
attorney general complete discretion to register or not register the
500,000 possible offenders.
Principal Deputy Solicitor General Jeffrey Wall argued on behalf
of the government. Wall stated unequivocally that the attorney general
could only make judgments as to the requirements of SORNA based
on feasibility, not some other policy judgment.184 Even if the Court
doubted the argument, Wall claimed, it should still construe the statute

176. See Brief for the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence as Amicus Curiae Supporting
the Petitioner at 10, Gundy, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (No. 17-6086) (“The ‘intelligible principle’ doctrine
has failed if it was meant as a check against an unconstitutional delegation . . . . This Court should
instead require Congress to enact judicially manageable guidelines to govern the scope of any
delegations of authority.”).
177. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2116; see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
179. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 3–4.
180. Id. at 4.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 22.
183. Id. at 24–25.
184. Id. at 42.
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narrowly to avoid the constitutional problem.185 Several Justices asked
about reading limiting language into the statute to save it from a
constitutional challenge.186 And that is exactly what the plurality
opinion did.
Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, wrote for the plurality.187 The Court faced,
in the eyes of the plurality, two different readings of the statute: to give
complete discretion to the attorney general over when or if to apply
the SORNA requirements to pre-Act offenders or, alternatively, to
mandate the attorney general to apply the SORNA requirements as
soon as possible, to the extent feasible.188 The text, structure, purpose,
and legislative history of § 20913(d) demonstrated that the attorney
general only had the power to adjust the registration requirements for
pre-Act offenders as needed for feasibility.189 He could not issue a
categorical excusal for some or all individuals. In light of the numerous
delegations with even broader standards the Court had sustained over
the years, the plurality easily answered the question of SORNA’s
constitutionality.190 If “SORNA’s delegation is unconstitutional,” the
plurality concluded, then so was “most of Government.”191
Justice Alito cast the deciding vote in Gundy, voting to affirm
without joining the plurality’s analysis.192 He reasoned that the statute
did have a discernable standard based on current doctrine.193 However,
he was amenable to changing the Court’s approach to nondelegation,
which has been untouched for eighty-four years, provided that a
majority of the Court could support a single approach.194 Otherwise, “it

185. Id.
186. During oral argument Justice Sotomayor asked Baumgartel “why is the reading in a
feasibility here so unusual, given . . . [the Court has] routinely . . . read into delegation cases
limits[?]” Id. at 22. Similarly, Justice Kagan noted there seemed to be “some language in the
statute that supports the government’s reading” of “some feasibility constraint . . . in the statute
as long as you’re taking the statute as a whole.” Id. at 10–11.
187. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019).
188. Id. at 2123.
189. See id. at 2123–29 (discussing the correct interpretation of § 20913(d)).
190. Id. at 2129.
191. Id. at 2130.
192. Id. at 2130–31 (Alito, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 2130.
194. Id. at 2131 (“If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have
taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.”).

HALL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

9/17/2020 5:16 PM

200

[Vol. 70:175

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

would be freakish to single out the provision at issue here for special
treatment.”195
Given the vote split, many legal commentators agree that the
nondelegation test faces an uncertain future.196 Although a
reinvigoration is not guaranteed, the possibility remains strong that the
Court will revisit and, potentially, apply the Gorsuch test, either in part
or in whole.
B. Gorsuch’s Dissent
As to how to reinvigorate the nondelegation doctrine, Justice
Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts,
authored a dissent, in which he proposed a test that would accomplish
that goal.197 First, beginning with the statutory analysis, Gorsuch took
the opposite reading of § 20913(d) of SORNA, finding it gives a blank
check to the attorney general to impose registration requirements on
any number of pre-Act offenders, or on none at all.198 This reading
entailed a “vast” and uncontrolled “breadth of authority.”199 Indeed,
nothing could be salvaged from the text, structure, purpose statement,
or legislative history to counter the plain meaning.200 Different
attorneys general used the authority granted by the statute in varying
ways.201 The government, in Reynolds, even suggested a similar
reading.202

195.
196.

Id.
See, e.g., Trevor Burrus, Neil Gorsuch Catches a Hail Mary for the Constitution, AM.
CONSERVATIVE (June 28, 2019, 1:13 PM), https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/neilgorsuch-catches-a-hail-mary-for-the-constitution [https://perma.cc/M3GQ-7ZNP] (arguing that
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion “could eventually roll back decades of executive overreach”); Mila
Sohoni, Opinion Analysis: Court Refuses to Resurrect Nondelegation Doctrine, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 20, 2019, 10:32 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/opinion-analysis-court-refusesto-resurrect-nondelegation-doctrine [https://perma.cc/JG9L-V5ST] (“For the nondelegation
doctrine, the significance of Gundy lies not in what the Supreme Court did today, but in what the
dissent and the concurrence portend for tomorrow.”).
197. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131, 2136–37 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 2132.
199. Id.
200. See id. at 2146–47 (“And as we have seen, the only part of the statute that speaks to preAct sex offenders—§ 20913(d)—makes plain that they are not automatically subject to all the
Act’s terms but are left to their fate at the hands of the Attorney General.”).
201. Id. at 2132.
202. See id. (“As the Department of Justice itself has acknowledged, SORNA ‘does not
require the Attorney General’ to impose registration requirements on pre-Act offenders.”
(quoting Brief for the United States at 23, Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012) (No.
10-6549))).
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Second, after interpreting the statute broadly, Gorsuch moved to
his nondelegation discussion. He emphasized that the principle of the
separation of powers was enshrined within the Constitution.
Legislative power, John Locke wrote, “cannot transfer . . . for it being
but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it
over to others.”203 In a nation with unchecked legislative delegations,
laws would no longer “be few in number,” which would deprive them
of social legitimacy and risk hurting minority interests.204 A citizen
could not hold a legislator accountable if that legislator had given her
legislative authority to another person.205 A power or responsibility
struggle might ensue between Congress and the executive.206 Each one
would aim to gain the credit without shouldering the blame for difficult
decisions.207 Liberty must be cherished, and, in Gorsuch’s eyes,
nondelegation protects liberty interests.208
As a result, Gorsuch argued that a Court should only uphold a
statute if: (1) the agency’s task is to “fill up the details”; (2) the
application of the statute turns on executive fact-finding; or (3) the
grant of power involves certain nonlegislative responsibilities.209 First,
filling up the details requires that Congress itself make the policy
decision.210 Examples of detail filling include ordering federal courts to
follow state rules but make alterations, assigning to the Internal
Revenue Service commissioner the duty to design a tax stamp, and
granting the secretary of agriculture the ability to adopt rules
regulating the use of public forests to avoid destruction.211 Second,
executive fact-finding involves the gathering of factual information by
either the president or one of his subordinates to decide if a statute
should apply.212 This could be the state of trade relations or trade
interference with a foreign power, or whether a bridge might cause
difficulty with maritime navigation of the East River.213 Finally,
nonlegislative responsibilities include tasks already within the scope of

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 2133.
Id. at 2135.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2136–37.
Id. at 2136.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the executive power, such as certain “foreign affairs powers” entrusted
to the president.214
Applying the three-part test to his reading of § 20913(d), Gorsuch
found that the act amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power. Admittedly, details “can sometimes be difficult to
discern,” and Congress can, even under the new test, allow an agency
to fill up “highly consequential” ones.215 What mattered most in
Gundy, however, was whether Congress “prescribe[d] the rule
governing private conduct.”216 Gorsuch speculated that members of
Congress could not agree on an approach to pre-Act offenders, so it
delegated that policy choice to the attorney general.217 Such a choice
was not one of filling up details—rather, it was an exercise of legislative
authority. Moreover, Congress could have made the statute simply turn
on executive fact-finding. By perhaps giving criteria to the attorney
general to investigate, such as the chance of an offender committing
another crime, Congress might have satisfied the second prong.218 It did
not. Nor did SORNA touch on “overlapping authority with the
executive.”219 The “duties and rights” of citizens involved a
“quintessentially legislative power.”220 Given that the disputed
provision in SORNA could satisfy no element of the newly created test,
the dissenters would have struck it down as an unconstitutional
delegation of power.221 More broadly, three Justices would evaluate all
future challenges to congressional authority using the Gorsuch test.
III. THE GORSUCH TEST IN PERSPECTIVE
Understanding how Justice Gorsuch’s proposal relates to previous
nondelegation tests and case law offers clues to its potential impact.
Undoubtedly, the Gorsuch test, if ever applied, would be the strictest
form of the nondelegation principle in the past ninety years—maybe
longer. To begin, Justice Gorsuch adopted the “fill up the details”
formulation used by the Court during the nineteenth century, in
214. Id. at 2137.
215. Id. at 2143.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2144 (“The statute here also sounds all the alarms the founders left for us. Because
Congress could not achieve the consensus necessary to resolve the hard problems associated with
SORNA’s application to pre-Act offenders, it passed the potato to the Attorney General.”).
218. Id. at 2143.
219. Id. at 2143–44.
220. Id. at 2144.
221. Id. at 2143–45.
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addition to the two other areas he identified. Seemingly, this implies at
least a broader test than just “fill up the details” alone. But the Court
never used this nineteenth century test to strike down a statute for
violating the nondelegation principle using this nineteenth century test.
Indeed, as detailed above,222 numerous capacious standards survived
this review. If Justice Gorsuch envisions just applying the test more
rigorously, then his proposal’s application, even if no different in form,
would still be more stringent.
Clearer is Justice Gorsuch’s stance on the intelligible principle
inquiry. He believed that the Hampton Court never wanted to create
the intelligible principle test.223 Chief Justice Taft “sought only to
explain the operation of [certain] traditional tests.”224 The current
nondelegation doctrine instead “[took] on a life of its own.”225 The
passing phrase became a standard that virtually no statute has failed.
To Justice Gorsuch, “This mutated version of the ‘intelligible principle’
remark has no basis in the original meaning of the Constitution, in
history, or even in the decision from which it was plucked.”226 Thus, the
Court must abandon it. This stance markedly differs from even the
Panama Refining Court’s reasoning, which did not seek to repudiate
any previous tests or cases.227 Justice Gorsuch remarked that no one
believed the phrase would ever become the foundation for the
nondelegation doctrine.228 He even refused to state whether the statute
at issue in Hampton would satisfy the “traditional tests” he announced,
only conceding that a “good argument” could be made on the
subject.229
In addition, Justice Gorsuch’s version would more tightly police
legislative delegation than Justice Rehnquist’s Benzene formulation.230
Rehnquist argued that the Court must examine whether: (1) the grant
of power is consistent with “orderly governmental administration,”
ensuring that “important choices of social policy are made by

222. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
223. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131, 2138–39 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 2139.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 429–30 (1935) (finding limits on the ability of
Congress to delegate but not overturning any case law or test).
228. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131, 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
229. Id.
230. Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607, 686–87
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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Congress”; (2) the recipient of the authority is guided by an intelligible
principle; and (3) the recipient of the authority has exceeded that
standard.231 The intelligible principle standard was still central for
Justice Rehnquist, who merely supplemented it with a review of
whether Congress made the general policy considerations and whether
the recipient of the delegation had acted within the grant of power.232
Justice Rehnquist did not go so far as to say that the Court should
engage in an extensive inquiry into whether an administrative rule
really filled up the details of the statute or enacted major policy.
Rather, he focused on the idea that “important choices of social policy”
should be made by the legislature—a less absolutist stance than Justice
Gorsuch’s prohibition against agencies making any policy
determinations.233
Again, in contrast to Justice Rehnquist’s formulation, the Gorsuch
test would discard the phrase “intelligible principle.”234 Possibly,
Justice Gorsuch’s antipathy toward the current test is rooted in the
application of the nondelegation principle, not the word choice itself.
Alternatively, he might just think that a word choice closer to the
originalist meaning of the nondelegation principle is the preferred
route. In any event, Justice Rehnquist, far more so than Justice
Gorsuch, acknowledged the benefits of delegation by maintaining a
balance in his proposal with the intelligible principle test.235 Congress
needs the ability to function efficiently by leaving some things to
agencies. Thus, Rehnquist implied that there is inherently something
different in “important” versus routine policy decisions by agencies.236
Gorsuch does not acknowledge the same distinction.
Although Justice Gorsuch has not specifically advocated
overruling any previous case law, it is worth considering whether many

231. Id. at 685–86.
232. Id.
233. Compare id. at 685 (“[T]he nondelegation doctrine . . . ensures . . . that important
choices of social policy are made by Congress.”), with Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (“[A]s long as Congress makes the policy decisions . . . it may authorize another
branch to ‘fill up the details.’”).
234. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2138–39 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“No one at the time thought the
phrase meant to effect some revolution in this Court’s understanding of the Constitution.”).
235. See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 685–86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[T]he doctrine guarantees
that, to the extent Congress finds it necessary to delegate authority, it provides the recipient of
that authority with an ‘intelligible principle’ to guide the exercise of the delegated discretion.”
(citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) and Pan. Refin. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935))).
236. Id.
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cases would still be good law under his test. The Court has decided over
a dozen nondelegation cases since 1935. And each time, it has sustained
the statutory grant of authority. Justice Gorsuch referred to only four
nondelegation opinions favorably in his analysis: Touby v. United
States,237 Loving v. United States,238 Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline
Co.,239 and State Oil Co. v. Khan.240 Conspicuously absent from his list
were many of the seminal post-Schechter nondelegation cases:
Benzene, Cotton Dust, Mistretta, and Whitman.
The consequences of not explaining how a new test affects old case
law could be dire. Combined with the sheer number of statutes that use
a general standard, the lack of clarity in the doctrine could open the
floodgates to thousands of lawsuits. Additionally, litigants may raise a
nondelegation issue more frequently.241 Criminals convicted under
administrative rules established under now-suspect laws might
hurriedly challenge their sentences. Companies seeking to avoid
liability or regulation could preemptively dispute the ability of
regulatory bodies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Federal Reserve, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
Alternatively, they may delay litigation for years, raising challenges to
each of the statutory provisions that governs the case. Agency actions
might be chilled. Unable to know if their regulations will be upheld,
bound by a test without clarity, and without the financial resources to
fight every lawsuit, administrative bodies may forgo issuing major
regulations altogether. Although some courts might see “fill up the
details” as simply a moderately more stringent intelligible principle
test, doctrinal approaches will likely vary greatly, and there is a
potential for an uneven application of law based on such factors as the
size of the court docket, the location of the challenge, and even political

237. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991).
238. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
239. Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989).
240. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
241. More work is needed to measure the number of nondelegation challenges simply raised,
as opposed to the number of nondelegation cases decided, both historically and since the Supreme
Court issued Gundy. As of June 8, 2020, Westlaw recorded eighty-three citing references to the
case. Citing References for Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019), WESTLAW (last visited
June 8, 2020). That seems to be a remarkably high number considering how infrequently these
challenges were raised. Unfortunately, it is impossible to draw any inferences until empirical
studies have examined this question.
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ideology. Regardless, as in the wake of other dramatic shifts,242 lower
courts will likely be left perplexed.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Although many areas of government might be destabilized by
Justice Gorsuch’s proposal, there are a few examples, identified from
previous cases, law review articles, and case briefs, that will likely be
most affected by a change in doctrine. Further, theoretically applying
the Gorsuch test to two recently decided cases in lower court opinions,
which used the intelligible principle test, illustrates the difficulty in
changing nondelegation jurisprudence.
A. The “Three Hundred Thousand” Problem
Part of the criticism of Justice Gorsuch’s test can be distilled into
a simple phrase: “Look before you leap.” There is a looming question
for the nondelegation doctrine—if you applied the reasoning in Justice
Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy to other nondelegation challenges, how
would that affect the countless other statutes with similar phrasing to
SORNA? At oral argument, Justice Breyer estimated that the number
of standards as broad as SORNA could be three hundred thousand.243
Congress has relied on the intelligible principle understanding of the
nondelegation doctrine for almost a hundred years. Under this
reliance, Congress has enacted statutes that have shaped American
lives in large and small ways.
Justice Breyer drew particular attention in oral argument to laws
regulating the Securities and Exchange Commission.244 To his point,
the Commission can promulgate rules controlling the means of a short
sale “as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.”245 But the Commission’s authority extends
even further to overseeing securities and enforcing any violation of its

242. Consider both the outpouring of scholarship and lower court confusion in the wake of
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
See, e.g., William H. J. Hubbard, The Effects of Twombly and Iqbal, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 474, 474 (2017) (“Ever since Twombly and Iqbal introduced the doctrine of plausibility
pleading, a cottage industry of legal scholars (including myself) has undertaken to detect [their]
effects . . . on litigants and case outcomes. Results so far have been equivocal . . . .”).
243. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 7–8.
244. Id. at 7 (“What about the most famous regulation, that I think people in this room would
imagine, Rule 10b-5?”).
245. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2018); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2018) (regulating insider trading
under the authority of 15 U.S.C. § 78j).
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rules with steep criminal penalties.246 A strict application of the
Gorsuch test might render one of the most influential bodies in
American government powerless. Correspondingly, it could leave
consumers without certain protections and rob the markets of
structures deriving from these regulations. The power of the
Commission does not depend on merely filling up details. It must
constantly evaluate policy considerations, in the interests of the statute,
that guide its rulemaking discretion.
In Gundy, the government and plurality identified a few
illustrative examples of laws that could be upended if the
nondelegation doctrine changed.247 Under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act, every foreign agent must include a “conspicuous
statement” of their communications with certain foreign powers.248 The
attorney general can define a “conspicuous statement,” then prosecute
and imprison someone for not meeting the definition.249 The Federal
Reserve Board can decide whether certain restrictions that carry
criminal penalties apply to forms of credit.250 A change in the policy of
the Board could alter the status for thousands, all of whom could spend
time in jail based on an agency definition.
As for examples from historical cases and scholarship, the Federal
Trade Commission operates to prevent “unfair methods of
competition.”251 The Federal Communications Commission can grant
or deny licenses based on vague standards of “public convenience and
necessity” or “public interest.”252 The secretary of transportation,

246. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
247. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130 (2019) (noting at least two statutes that
delegate feasibility determinations to executive officials); Brief for United States, supra note 170,
at 45 & nn.10–11 (citing numerous statutes where Congress has delegated to an executive agency
the determination of whether someone will face criminal liability as well as the “authority to
prescribe substantive requirements in rules and regulations and has separately made it a crime to
violate those requirements”).
248. 22 U.S.C. §§ 614(b), 618 (2018).
249. Id. § 614(b).
250. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c)(3)(B).
251. Id. § 45(a). Indeed, the Schechter Court actually approved the Federal Trade
Commission when ruling on NIRA. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 504 (1935).
252. See 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (2018) (“No carrier shall discontinue, reduce, or impair service to
a community, or part of a community, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from
the Commission a certificate that neither the present nor future public convenience and necessity
will be adversely affected thereby . . . .”); id. § 307(a) (“The Commission, if public convenience,
interest, or necessity will be served thereby, subject to the limitations of this chapter, shall grant
to any applicant therefor a station license provided for by this chapter.”); id. § 309(a) (“[T]he
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through the National Highway Transportation and Safety Authority,
sets standards as “practicable” to “meet the need for motor vehicle
safety.”253 The Federal Aviation Administration can “take such other
action, including the modification of safety and security procedures
and flight deck redesign, as may be necessary to ensure the safety and
security of the aircraft.”254 In times of economic depression, Congress
has given emergency power to the president to “issue such orders and
regulations as he may deem appropriate to stabilize prices, rents,
wages, and salaries.”255 Ultimately, it is difficult to argue, using Justice
Gorsuch’s rationale, that these statutes may not also be impermissible
delegations.
B. Uneasy Application
The confusing nature of the Gorsuch test becomes more apparent
when used to decide two sample nondelegation challenges, one
criminal and one civil, in the lower courts.256 The standards
Commission shall determine, in the case of each application filed with it to which § 308 of this title
applies, whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served by the granting of
such application . . . .”); see also Robert L. Pacholski, Note, FCC and Reciprocity: An Examination
of the Public Interest Standard, 62 TEX. L. REV. 319, 319 (1983) (“Such a broad mandate [granted
to the Commission] . . . holds the potential for abuses of power through expansive and groundless
construction of the term ‘public interest.’”). But see Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 225–26 (1943) (rejecting the claim “that the standard of ‘public interest’ governing the
exercise of the powers delegated to the Commission by Congress is so vague and indefinite that,
if it be construed as comprehensively as the words alone permit, the delegation of legislative
authority is unconstitutional.” Instead, the Court notes that the Commission does not make “mere
general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations”) Id. (quoting
N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24 (1932)).
253. 49 U.S.C. § 30111(a) (2018). Although not assessing the delegation, the Court examined
a standard made pursuant to this authority in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the U.S. v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
254. 49 U.S.C. § 44903.
255. See The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (formerly
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1904).
256. No precise formula was used in selecting these two cases. Rather, the aim was to find
two that captured representative nondelegation challenges under the intelligible principle test
within the past twenty years. Some fact patterns were quite lengthy and, as such, did not lend
themselves to the format of a Note. For more examples of nondelegation challenges that might
lead to a different outcome under the Gorsuch test, see United States v. Brown, 364 F.3d 1266,
1272 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that “promot[ing] and regulat[ing] the use of the Federal areas
known as national parks, monuments, and reservations . . . by such means and measures as
conform to the fundamental purpose . . . [of] conserve[ing] the scenery” is not too broad under
constitutional nondelegation standards); United States v. Garfinkel, 29 F.3d 451, 455, 459 (8th
Cir. 1994) (holding that the Federal Drug Administration’s ability to enact “regulations . . .
relating to the protection of the public health” meaningfully restrains agency action); U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Oystacher, 203 F. Supp. 3d 934, 950–52 (N.D. Ill. 2016)
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promulgated by Congress in both cases were broad, and agencies
created rules pursuant to those broad standards. The litigants raised
nondelegation challenges and lost. Under the Gorsuch test, the result
in each case might have been different—or might not have been.
Theorizing the application of a different rule demonstrates both the
lack of clarity with the Gorsuch test and the far-reaching consequences
of changing nondelegation jurisprudence.
Every federal criminal law, no matter how seemingly insignificant,
could be impacted by the Gorsuch test, as demonstrated by United
States v. Komatsu.257 There, Towaki Komatsu approached a Court
Security Officer (“CSO”) outside of a courthouse building in New
York City.258 The CSO was on his way to work.259 Komatsu shouted a
profanity at the CSO, who returned the insult.260 In response, Komatsu
charged at him with a pen in his hand.261 The CSO parried the thrust
and forced Komatsu to the ground.262
After the incident was reported, Komatsu was charged with
violating 40 U.S.C. § 1315 and the accompanying federal rule 41 C.F.R.
§ 102-74.390.263 Section 1315 instructs the secretary of homeland
security to “prescribe regulations necessary for the protection and
administration of property owned or occupied by the Federal
Government.”264 Violators can either be fined, imprisoned for a period
up to thirty days, or both.265 The secretary then promulgated a rule
penalizing persons on federal property for behavior that:

(drawing upon text, legislative findings, and purpose to determine that the Spoofing Statute of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Form and Consumer Protection Act of 2012 “provide[s] an
intelligible principle guiding the [agency’s] conduct”); Rothe Dev. Inc. v. Dep’t of Def., 107 F.
Supp. 3d 183, 188–89, 211–12 (D.D.C. 2015) (ruling that the Small Business Administration’s
power to “acquire procurement contracts from other government agencies and to award . . . those
contracts by small businesses ‘whenever [the agency] determines such action is necessary’” to help
disadvantaged individuals satisfies the intelligible principle test); Def. of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527
F. Supp. 2d 119, 127 (D.D.C. 2007) (upholding the power of the Department of Homeland
Security to build barriers across the border of the United States to “deter illegal crossings”).
257. United States v. Komatsu, No. 18-cr-651, 2019 WL 2358020, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 4,
2019).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at *2.
264. 40 U.S.C. § 1315(c) (2018).
265. Id.
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(a) Creates loud or unusual noise or a nuisance;

(b) Unreasonably obstructs the usual use of entrances, foyers,
lobbies, corridors, offices, elevators, stairways, or parking
lots;
(c) Otherwise impedes or disrupts the performance of official
duties by Government employees; or
(d) Prevents the general public from obtaining the
administrative services provided on the property in a timely
manner.266

The government cited parts (a) and (c) in Komatsu’s indictment to
support its position.267 In turn, the defendant raised numerous
constitutional objections, including a nondelegation challenge to
§ 1315.268
Magistrate Judge Tiscione decided Komatsu only a couple of
weeks before the Gundy opinion was released, disposing of the
challenge in one page.269 Under current doctrine, § 1315 has an
intelligible principle, “the protection and administration of property
owned or occupied by the Federal Government.”270 Indeed, three other
courts examining the same issue agreed.271 Because the regulation that
Komatsu violated was made pursuant to an intelligible principle, it is
constitutionally sound.
Under the Gorsuch framework, the case may have been resolved
against the government. The first prong instructs that an agency can
only “fill up the details,” with the major policy decision residing with
Congress. Here, the attorney for the defendant could argue that
“protection and administration” of government property gives too
much leeway to the Department of Homeland Security to make
important policy decisions, thus doing more than “filling up the
details.” The operative word in the statute is “may,” which is
permissive, unlike the “shall” in SORNA, which is mandatory. The
266. 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.390 (2019).
267. See Komatsu, 2019 WL 2358020, at *2 (“The Government cites subsections (a) and (c)
of the regulation [41 C.F.R. § 102-74.390] in its Second Superseding Information . . . .”); see also
Second Superseding Misdemeanor Info., at 1, Komatsu, 2019 WL 2358020 (citing 41 C.F.R. § 10274.390).
268. See Defendant Towaki Komatsu’s Reply Memorandum in Support of His Pre-trial
Motions at 6–10, Komatsu, 2019 WL 2358020.
269. Komatsu, 2019 WL, 2358020 at *1.
270. Id. at *5 (citing 40 U.S.C. § 1315 (2018)).
271. Id. at *6.

HALL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

THE GORSUCH TEST

9/17/2020 5:16 PM

211

secretary could establish hundreds of rules, tens of rules, or no rules at
all. She possesses the complete power to prohibit virtually any activity
in federal government buildings. If the secretary chooses, she could
allow people to run freely, shout with microphones, hold rallies, or
harass potential litigants on the way to the courtroom.
Alternatively, the secretary could impose very stringent
requirements up to any other constitutional bar. She could ban any
communication devices, limit the number of times a person can enter a
building, or decide to impose a fee. The text of the statute is not
constraining. Like in Gundy, this power also carries the criminal
penalty of imprisonment. And the secretary’s choice would affect
millions of visitors to public buildings, many times the number of
sexual offenders affected by SORNA. Consequently, the secretary is
arguably making policy decisions, not filling up details, and her choices
will be the ones visible to the public. If the Gorsuch test prioritizes
political accountability, then § 1315 allows legislators to circumvent the
task of setting potentially unpleasant rules in the public sphere. This
abdication of legislative responsibility would be an unconstitutional
delegation of power.
Nor can it be argued that § 1315 involves executive fact-finding or
nonlegislative responsibilities. The statute does not ask the agency to
make any factual determinations, such as whether a warring power has
blocked trading or if a bridge might interfere with commerce. Further,
rules regulating conduct in government buildings have never been the
traditional domain of the executive. They do not fall under the
president’s national-security or foreign-affairs-related powers.
Therefore, neither the second nor third prongs of the Gorsuch test
would save this delegation of power from its alleged constitutional
deficiency.
Of course, the test can arguably be applied more liberally. The “fill
up the details” formulation may reach more activities than indicated in
Gorsuch’s dissent. The government might contend that Congress still
made the major policy decision to regulate the space around federal
properties but just needed the secretary to designate what types of
activities would fall within the statute. It is not clear, however, why that
same logic would not apply to SORNA. Congress made the decision to
have some pre-Act offenders included within the statute, and the
attorney general, under Gorsuch’s reading, had the discretion
regarding when and how to enroll them. Thus, this example illustrates
the capacious nature of the “fill up the details” prong. The line between
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“policy” and “details” can be so easily blurred as to render the
distinction almost unenforceable.
A 2008 challenge to a civil statute, in Michigan Gambling
Opposition v. Kempthorne272 out of the D.C. Circuit, exemplifies how
the civil side of the judicial system is potentially affected. A small band
of the Pottawatomi Indians273 living in Michigan wanted land to
construct a casino.274 The tribe’s size had dwindled after decades of
harsh federal policy that left most members landless and destitute.275
The unemployment rate was six times that of the neighboring area, and
the casino offered a step toward “economic self-sufficiency.”276 After
obtaining recognition of their tribal status under the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (“BIA”) and complying with all the formal procedures, the
tribe and the BIA planned to acquire a trace of land in a rural area of
Grand Rapids for their casino operation.277 Under § 5 of the Indian
Reorganization Act (“IRA”), the secretary of the interior can “in his
discretion . . . acquire, through purchase . . . any interest in lands, water
rights, or surface rights to lands . . . for the purpose of providing land
for Indians.”278 The Michigan Gambling Opposition argued that § 5 of
IRA violated the nondelegation doctrine.279
A divided panel found that the phrase “for Indians” satisfied the
intelligible principle test.280 In light of the purpose, structure, and
legislative history of IRA, in addition to the broad standards approved
by the Supreme Court, the panel considered it permissible. The
purpose of IRA was to “rehabilitate the Indian’s economic life and to
give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of
oppression.”281 Other parts of IRA help define § 5’s scope. These
provisions govern tribal trusts, help return lands to the trusts, place

272.
273.

Mich. Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne, 525 F.3d 23 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
The actual spelling of the Pottawatomi Tribe varies. See CARL WALDMAN,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBES 234 (2006) (spelling the tribe’s name as
“Potawatomi” and noting that “[d]ifferent spellings are preserved in place-names as well as
historical records”). This Note reproduces the nomenclature used by the D.C. Circuit, the
“Pottawatomi Indians,” but does not endorse any specific terminology.
274. Mich. Gambling, 525 F.3d at 26.
275. See id. (noting that the tribe’s size dwindled concurrently with broad federal policies
designed to break up tribal holdings).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 26–27.
278. 25 U.S.C. § 5108 (2018).
279. Mich. Gambling, 525 F.3d at 27–28.
280. Id. at 30.
281. Id. at 31 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973)).
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limits on transfers, and give federal dollars to support economic
developments.282 Several house and senate reports fortify the
conclusion that § 5 must be read in light of helping tribes overcome
“economic and social challenges.”283 The standard “need not be utterly
unambiguous,” and, thus, the phrase “for Indians” sufficed to guide
agency discretion.284
The interpretive method used by the majority in Michigan
Gambling aligns exactly with the plurality in Gundy and, as such, would
probably be rejected under Justice Gorsuch’s version of the
nondelegation doctrine. Both the Gundy plurality and the Michigan
Gambling panel used the purpose, structure, and legislative history of
each respective piece of legislation to help discern an intelligible
principle. Given that Justice Gorsuch rejected that approach, § 5 of
IRA likely would meet the same fate under his test. Under the Gorsuch
test, the language could not be saved by turning to the methods of
statutory interpretation, such as using legislative history and the canon
of constitutional avoidance. Thus, “for Indians” would be understood
in its broadest possible sense to allow the secretary of the interior to
purchase land for whatever possible purpose if it simply went to
indigenous groups. This expansive reading of the statute would be
subject to the three-part test proposed by Justice Gorsuch.
It is unlikely § 5 of IRA would survive a stricter nondelegation
doctrine. First, buying any land “for Indians” does more than task the
secretary of the interior with filling up the details. She can buy the land
for any reason, whether good or bad. One day the purchase might be
for herding. The next day the purchase might be for an amusement
park. There are no limits on her discretion of how to buy land, for what
purpose, and who might be affected. Here, the secretary chose
gambling, an activity that Congress might not sanction itself given the
complexities of state law or the possible perception of the practice as a
moral vice. There may be political fallout from a law that used federal
tax dollars to buy land for more casinos. But the legislative branch
avoided these problems by passing the buck to a faceless bureaucrat.
The statute requires more than filling up details. It needs large
policymaking.
Any effort to save this part of the IRA as either “executive factfinding” or “overlapping authority with the executive” would not
282.
283.
284.

Id.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
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succeed.285 The ability to purchase any land does not depend on any
type of fact, such as the end of a war. The secretary of the interior can
purchase land irrespective of any conditions. Congress did not impose
them, and the statute cannot be understood to include any. Purchasing
land for economic revitalization does not fall within a traditional
executive area. Section 5 would not be within any prong of the Gorsuch
test. Of course, like in Komatsu, the government could assert creative
ways of framing the statute to fit within “fill up the details.” The
standard “for Indians” could require the secretary to just assign
particular uses of lands already designated for use. If the reviewing
court approached the challenge like Justice Gorsuch examined
SORNA though, the different framing of the issue would not change
the outcome. Section 5 of the IRA would meet the fate of countless
other statutes that have relied on decades of the intelligible principle
test to empower agencies. Both criminal and civil statutes alike would
have difficulty satisfying Justice Gorsuch’s test.
CONCLUSION
The future of nondelegation is unclear. Courts continue to
examine statutes to determine if they set out an intelligible principle to
guide agency action. However, with the addition of Justice Kavanaugh,
at least five Justices have expressed, in one form or another, a desire to
alter the decades-old intelligible principle standard.
Against the backdrop of two hundred years of congressional
reliance and the still-ubiquitous need for Congress to delegate
efficiently, the choice to consider revitalizing the nondelegation
principle raises questions. The problem, however, is not just the choice
to revisit this topic but also the method Justice Gorsuch has suggested.
The Gorsuch test provides minimal doctrinal clarity. It rests mostly
upon nineteenth and early twentieth century cases that, at the height
of judicial scrutiny, did not strike down broad grants of power.
Problems would abound if a litigator tried to apply the Gorsuch test to
the potentially hundreds of thousands of laws that resemble the
standard in SORNA. Moreover, the very structure of power sharing
between the legislative and executive branches could be upended. If
the Supreme Court decides to revisit nondelegation, it should be
285. See supra notes 209–19 and accompanying text (describing the prongs of the Gorsuch
test); see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2216, 2143–44 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(concluding SORNA failed on the second and third prongs of executive fact-finding and shared
executive authority, respectively).
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cognizant of the various problems that will accompany a change in
jurisprudence. Better yet, the Court should retain the intelligible
principle test to ensure stability in the law, the government, and the
court system.

